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Abstract
Politicians, bureaucrats, owners, managers and employees are becoming increasingly concerned with the
capacity of Canadian corporations to survive and prosper in the twenty-first century. By and large, the
attention focused on competitiveness has developed from the rapid international integration of goods, capital
and service markets. This integration has resulted in the creation of a new borderless world, in which
consumer preferences reign supreme and in which those corporations that fail to anticipate, shape and
respond to these preferences with cost- and quality-competitive products face certain failure. Concern over
the survival of national firms commands widespread societal attention because of the dependency of many
core public policies on the economic surplus generated by robust private markets.
Given the focus on globalization and competitiveness, it is not at all surprising that academics have expended
considerable energy identifying and analyzing the determinants of national economic success in this new
international order. Although the composition of the basket of favoured policies varies from scholar to scholar,
most accord at least some importance to the quality of the system of corporate governance that obtains in a
given country. Tracking the modern use of this term, most scholars look beyond the mere operation of a firm's
formal governance apparatus (i. e., the board of directors) and consider how a wide range of market (e.g.,
capital, product, managerial and takeover markets), legal (e.g., derivative and personal suits) and political (e.g.,
shareholder voting) devices combine to discipline managerial behaviour.
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CHALLENGES TO THE CITADEL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF
RECENT TRENDS IN CANADIAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE *
Ronald j. Daniels and Edward}. Waitzer t
I. INTRODUCTION
Politicians, bureaucrats, owners, managers and employees are
becoming increasingly concerned with the capacity of Canadian
corporations to survive and prosper in the twenty-first century. By
and large, the attention focused on competitiveness has developed
from the rapid international integration of goods, capital and
service markets. This integration has resulted in the creation of a
new borderless world, in which consumer preferences reign
supreme and in which those corporations that fail to anticipate,
shape and respond to these preferences with cost- and quality-
competitive products face certain failure.) Concern over the
survival of national firms commands widespread societal attention
because of the dependency of many core public policies on the
economic surplus generated by robust private markets. 2
Given the focus on globalization and competitiveness, it is not at
all surprising that academics have expended considerable energy
identifying and analyzing the determinants of national economic
success in this new international order.3 Although the composition
• This article was completed in January 1993 and is current as of this date. An earlier
version of this article appeared in [April 19931 1 Corporate Governance - An Interna-
tional Review 66.
t Ronald Daniels is Associate Professor of Law and Director of the International Business
and Trade Law Programme at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Edward
Waitzer is Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission. At the time this article was
written, Edward Waitzer was a partner at the law firm of Stikeman, Elliott.
1 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York, Harper Business, 1990); Michael
Porter, The Competitive Advantage ofNations (New York, The Free Press, 1990).
2 This issue is discussed at length in Ronald Daniels and Robert Howse, "Reforming the
Reform Process: Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe" (1993),25 N. Y. Internat'l
J. L. & Pols., 27.
3 See Porter, supra, footnote 1. For a Canadian perspective on the issue, see Joseph D'Cruz
and Alan Rugman, New Compacts For Canadian Competitiveness (Toronto, Kodak
23
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of the basket of favoured policies varies from scholar to scholar,
most accord at least some importance to the quality of the system
of corporate governance that obtains in a given country. Tracking
the modern use of this term, most scholars look beyond the mere
operation of a firm's formal governance apparatus (i. e. , the board
of directors) and consider how a wide range of market (e.g.,
capital, product, managerial and takeover markets), legal (e.g.,
derivative and personal suits) and political (e.g., shareholder
voting) devices combine to discipline managerial behaviour.
In the main, the recent attention devoted to corporate gover-
nance and competitiveness is just the next chapter in a very long
and noble debate in the United States over the accountability of
the modern corporation. This debate is rooted in the seminal work
of Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means - The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.4 To Berle and Means, the fact that the
equity of most American corporations was splintered into
multiple, low stakes holdings meant that shareholders were
unable to exert meaningful control over management _. hence the
saliency of their memorable phrase "the separation of ownership
and control".
Although Berle and Means' attention to accountability in the
corporation has undoubtedly defined the intellectual agenda of
North American corporate scholars for well over half a century,
the validity of their analysis, as well as the policy prescriptions that
were predicated on it, have not gone unchallenged. Some
scholars, for instance, rejected Berle and Means' argument for
more extensive. government regulation by expressing faith in
various refinements to traditional governance mechanisms. Many
such suggestions turned on bolstering the role played by
independent directors. 5 Later, other scholars pointed to a range of
Canada, 1992). For a critical assessment of the linkage made by some scholars between
international competitiveness and corporate governance, see R.J. Daniels, "The 'Crisis'
in Canadian Corporate Governance" (August 1993), 51 Director 1.
4 (New York, MacMillan, 1933).
5 See, for instance, Mel Eisenberg, "Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern
Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants" (1975), 63 Cal. L. Rev. 375. The
claim that independent directors will improve corporate governance is not, however,
uncontroversial. See Victor Brudney, "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village" (1982), 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597; and Kenneth Scott, "Corporation Law
and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project" (1983), 35 Stan. L. Rev.
927. A more recent review of such proposals may be found in Ronald J. Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman, "Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Outside
Directors" (1991), 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863.
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market mechanisms, which they believed could complement and,
in some cases, supplant formal governance devices in controlling
corporate behaviour.6 For these scholars, the fact that formal
mechanisms of governance are plagued by endemic infirmities was
not sufficient to support legal changes. Rather, it was necessary to
show that, in tandem, some set of changes could improve on the
combined role of law and markets.
Although many of the fads and fashions in the American debate
over corporate governance have crossed the border, in many
respects the parallel Canadian debate is profoundly different from
that in the United States. In large part this is attributable to core
differences in the underlying structure of markets, as well as in the
organization of law and legal institutions operating in the two
countries.7 In this article, we survey these differences and then
proceed to identify two recent sets of factors that are powerfully
modifying the traditional system of corporate governance in
Canada - the rise of the institutional investor and the growing
socialization of the board. Although some scholars have implied
that these two factors can be easily accommodated through more
responsible and activist monitoring and intervention by the board,
we argue that this task is more vexing than it may at first appear.8
In tandem, these trends have unleashed powerful tensions and
contradictions in the corporate governance system. If corporate
governance is an important factor in competitiveness, it is imper-
ative that Canadian policymakers expend greater energy in sorting
through the implications of these trends.
II. CANADIAN MARKET ENVIRONMENT FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Perhaps the most salient difference in the structure of Canadian
6 The pioneering work is by Henry Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control" (1965), 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110. See also: Michael Jensen and William Meckling,
"Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure"
(1976),3 J. Fin. Econ. 305; and Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic
Structure ofCorporate Law (Cambridge, Mass. , Harvard University Press, 1991).
7 See Ronald Daniels and Jeffrey MacIntosh, "Toward A Distinctive Canadian Corporate
Law Regime" (1991),29 Osgoode Hall L. J. 863.
8 Donald Thain and David Leighton, The Director's Dilemma: What's My Job (London,
National Centre for Management Research and Development, The University of
Western Ontario, 1991). James Gillies also discusses the new board but is more sensitive
to conflicts and tensions: James Gillies, Boardroom Renaissance (Toronto, McGraw-Hill
Ryerson Ltd., 1992).
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and American markets is the much higher levels of share concen-
tration: 14% of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange ("TSE") 300 are widely held; 60.3% are controlled by a
single shareholder or group of shareholders with legal control
(i.e., more than 50% of the voting shares); and 25.4% are
controlled by a single shareholder or a group of shareholders with
effective control (i. e., between 20% and 49.9% of the voting
shares). In stark contrast, of the companies included in the
Fortune 500, approximately 63% are widely held, 12% have a
shareholder or group with legal control, and 18% have a share-
holder or group with effective control.9
The differences in share ownership concentration suggest that
the long-standing American concern with shareholder capacity to
discipline managers for self-indulgent conduct is less relevant in a
Canadian setting. Because most large public corporations in
Canada have a shareholder with legal or effective control, share-
holders will face fewer difficulties in detecting management
misconduct; consequently, they will also have less difficulty
initiating action aimed at disciplining errant management. tO
Knowing full well that controlling shareholders can vote a
stubborn board out of office at the next annual meeting, directors
will faithfully implement the controlling shareholders' desires. In
these terms, there has been little need to resort, as American
shareholders must, to expensive and traumatic hostile takeover
bids in order to effect a management change. ll A simple phone
call from the controlling shareholder should suffice.
However, the fact that most Canadian companies are not
plagued by accountability problems along the shareholder-
manager axis does not mean that accountability is never at issue in
the Canadian context. Nor has it led to demonstrable gains in
corporate managerial performance. Rather, the crucial axis for
conflict has simply shifted to that linking controlling shareholders
(served by management) with other investors, namely minority
shareholders or (to a lesser extent) creditors. 12 In both cases, the
9 Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 7, at p. 884.
10 A shareholder with a controlling block of shares has strong economic incentives to
undertake an appropriate level of monitoring and, if misconduct is observed, such share-
holders are not dogged by some of the serious collective action problems that impair
activism in the widely held company.
11 This is borne out empirically. Of the 1,148 Canadian merger and acquisition transactions
tracked in the Venture Economics database in 1989, only 7 resulted in management resis-
tance or in the makingofa competitive bid. Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 7, at
p.887.
12 Ibid., at pp. 884-8.
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tighter rein that controlling shareholders wield over managerial
actions poses risks (in the form of an increased likelihood of
bloated compensation arrangements, unfair self-dealing transac-
tions, or unanticipated changes in shareholder risk-taking). In any
event, fairness as between controlling and minority shareholders,
rather than irresponsible managerial performance, has become
the central focus ofexternal constraints on corporate conduct. 13
Exacerbating the fairness problems related to share ownership
concentration are the tensions spurred by highly interconnected
(and interdependent) corporate empires. Of the top 100 most
profitable companies in Canada in 1987, 45 held 10% or more of
the voting shares of another company on the list, although seldom
holding 100% of the shares. 14 The ties created by cross- ownership
are strengthened by an extensive pattern of inter-linked director-
ships. In percentage terms, 71.1% of Canadian board appoint-
ments were held by directors with only one appointment, 17.5%
by directors with two appointments and 11.4% by directors with
three or more appointments. In contrast, American data reveal
corresponding figures of81.8%, 11.1% and 7.1 % respectively.15
The concentrated power of the Canadian conglomerates (and
the major Canadian banks, whose support was a pre-condition of
the massive acquisition exercises of the last decade) is graphically
illustrated by the Hees/Edper empire; in 1989, the group
controlled more than 350 operating companies (almost always
with well under 100% control), spanning a wide range of indus-
tries, and controlled 8.31 % of the companies listed on the TSE
300.16 Further, one of the principals of the Hees/Edper group
holds more directorships (9) than any other director of companies
listed on the TSE 300. 17
The final significant characteristic of the Canadian market
environment is the pervasiveness of thinly traded stocks. Fowler
and Rorke, for instance, found that only 5.3% of the stocks listed
on the TSE (the largest Canadian stock exchange) were traded in
13 It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this preoccupation of the Canadian
regulatory framework has distracted owners and policy-makers from performance
oriented concerns.
14 Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 7, at p. 888.
IS Ibid.
16 Gillies, supra, footnote 8, at p. 110. The data on control of the TSE 300 are cited in
Gillies at pp. 108-9, and were derived from Edward Jeffries, The Edper Group: An
Industry Overview (Toronto, Walwyn Stodgell Cochran Murray Ltd., May 14, 1990).
17 Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 7, at p. 888.
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deep markets; of the remainder, 35.3% were moderately traded
and 59.4% were infrequently or thinly traded.18 As Coffee has
observed, the effect of liquidity problems on corporate gover-
nance is profound; by increasing the cost of exit, the attractiveness
of "voice", in this case meaning governance activism, is
heightened. 19
III. THE CANADIAN LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Another set of factors impacting on the distinctive features of
corporate governance in Canada is found in law and the nature of
legal institutions.2o Although superficial examination of the legal
regime governing Canadian corporations reveals striking similar-
ities to that found in the United States - e.g., corporate statutes
containing the standard mix of the broad fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty; restrictions on self-dealing transactions; and share-
holder voting and initiation rights - there are many important
differences in the legal regimes of the two countries that are
obscured by focusing solely on the content of corporate statutes.21
In the United States, states are responsible for administration of
corporate law. Owing to the range of benefits that can be realized
from incorporation activity, individual states vigorously joust with
one another to enhance the size of their charter market share.22
18 Fowler and Rorke, "Insider Trading Profits and the Canadian Equity Market", unpub-
lished draft, November 1985.
19 John Coffee, "Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor As a Corporate
Monitor" (1991), 91 Col. L. Rev. 1277. Black argues that the tension between liquidity
and "voice" has become muted, if it exists at all. In his view, institutional investors
should have some liquidity (although in many instances it is no longer relevant) and some
influence. Bernard S. Black, "Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice" (1992), 39 U .c.L.A. L. Rev. 81.
20 Law and legal institutions are discussed briefly in Daniels and MacIntosh, supra,
footnote 7, at pp. 892-900.
21 The similarity in the content ofcorporate statutes is not at all surprising given the reliance
of the framers of the pre-eminent model of corporate law in Canada, the Canada
Business Corporation Act, on American precedents. See acknowledgement, Robert
Dickerson et al., Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (Ottawa,
Information Canada, 1971), p. iv.
22 Although the desirability of charter market competition among states is controversial,
there is little disagreement over the positive claim that competition, in fact, exists. See,
WilIiam Cary, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware" (1974), 83
Yale L. J. 663; Ralph Winter, "State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theoryofthe
Corporation" (1977), 6 J. Legal Studies 251. The leading empirical analyst of the
American Charter Market is Roberta Romano. See, for instance, "Law as a Product:
Some Pieces ofthe Incorporation Puzzle" (1985), 11. L., Econ. and Organ. 225.
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Ever since the state of New Jersey opted out of the competition,
the dominant incorporation jurisdiction has been Delaware. This
is not to say that a "good" corporate law alone can secure success;
as Romano has shown, Delaware's dominance is due as much to
the breadth of judicial precedents it has amassed, the quality of its
specialized bar and judiciary, and the various institutionalized
linkages it has forged between the legislature and the American
corporate law community.23
In sharp contrast, the Canadian system of corporate law lacks a
lead jurisdiction like Delaware. 24 This lack of jurisdictional
specialization is odd given superficial similarities to the United
States. As in the United States, corporate law jurisdiction is highly
decentralized (each of the provinces, plus the federal government,
offers a corporate law) and conflicts-of-Iaw rules ensure that
corporate disputes will be adjudicated under the laws of the juris-
diction of incorporation.25 The predictable effect of weak speciali-
zation is underdeveloped corporate law infrastructure, strikingly
manifested in the lack of specialized corporate/commercial
courts,26 scant judicial precedent, shallow legislative interest in
corporate/commercial matters and sluggish rates of legislative
innovation.
Although a number of different theories have been posited to
explain the dearth of specialized corporate law institutions in
Canada, perhaps the most persuasive is the jurisdictional appetite
of provincial securities regulators.27 Because of blurring in the line
that separates securities and corporate law jurisdiction, provincial
securities regulators (of which the most important in Canada is the
23 Romano, ibid.
24 Ronald Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate
Law Market" (1991), 36 McGill L. J. 130. See also; Jeffrey Macintosh, "The Role of
Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law: A Second Look" ,
unpublished manuscript on file with the authors, Spring, 1992.
25 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (August 20, 1992, draft
version of monograph to be published by American Enterprise Institute).
26 And although the province of Ontario has recently introduced a process by which judges
of the trial division can signal an interest in commercial and corporate matters (the "com-
mercial list"), the impact of this self-selection process on judicial decision-making is
likely to be minimal. This is because judges on the list will still carry a wide range of
generalist responsibilities that will impair concentration on corporate/commercial
matters. Further, decisions rendered at the trial level are subject to reversal by generalist
judges sitting on the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.
1:1 This point (and other possible reasons for weak specialization) are discussed by Daniels,
supra, footnote 24.
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Ontario Securities Commission) have been able to insinuate
themselves into the heart of traditional corporate law matters. For
instance, by construing their public interest mandate liberally,
Canadian securities regulators have made themselves the de facto
guardian of the rights of minority shareholders in public
companies. 28 As this securities jurisdiction can be validly invoked
with the barest of claims (the effects test),29 the demand for
judicial intervention is relatively low. 30
Apart from the pre-emptive effect on the infrastructure of
corporate law, expansive securities regulation has had other
important effects on the nature of the corporate governance
regime in Canada. For one thing, although the vindication of
traditional corporate law concerns through the apparatus of
securities regulation may appear desirable because it avoids some
of the collective action problems that dissident shareholders
wishing to mount a derivative suit confront in the United States,31
this administrative intervention likely has inflicted costs on the
quality of corporate decision-making in Canada. Instead of
encouraging Canadian shareholders, directors and managers to
experiment themselves with private solutions to conflict-of-
interest problems - all of which will occur in the shadow of
possible ex post judicial review - securities regulators have
explicitly nourished the formation and perpetuation of a scheme32
in which endemic conflicts are resolved by an ex ante dialogue
28 Philip Anisman, "The Commission as Protector of Minority Shareholders", Securities
Law: Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures (Toronto, Richard De Boo, 1989),
at p. 452; Hudson Janisch, "Reregulating the Regulator: Administrative Structure of
Securities Commissions and Ministerial Responsibility", Securities Law: Law Society of
Upper Canada Special Lectures (Toronto, Richard De Boo, 1989), at p. 97; and Brian
Pukier, "Taking Care of Business: An Examination of the Ontario Securities Commis-
sion's Public Interest Mandate". Paper on file with authors.
29 Edward Morgan, "Extraterritoriality and Insider Trading", paper delivered at 1992
International Bar Association Conference.
30 Historically, structural disincentives to private enforcement, including barriers to class
actions and contingent fee arrangements, the risks of costs being awarded against an
unsuccessful claimant and limits on damage awards, also explain the lack of demand for
judicial relief.
31 Roberta Romano, "The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?" (1991),7 J.
L., Econ. and Organ. 55.
32 See, for instance, O.S.c. Policy 9.1 (1991), 14 O.S.C.B. 3345. In these terms, the lack of
a clearly developed fiduciary duty from majority to minority shareholders in Canada is
curious and may be explained by the pre-emptive effect of detailed administrative agency
"fairness" standards. This theme is discussed in Jeffrey MacIntosh et al., "The Puzzle of
Shareholder Fiduciary Duties" (1991), 19 c.B.L.J. 86.
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conducted between the staff of administrative tribunals and
corporate insiders.33 Ignoring obvious transparency problems, the
most serious difficulty with ex ante administrative review pertains
to its potential debilitating effects on shareholder and directorial
responsibility. Put simply, the highly interventionist stance of the
provincial securities commissions keeps shareholders and
directors suspended in a perpetual state of dependence on the
whims and protections offered by a well-intentioned, but often
undisciplined, benefactor.34
Regulation may have been dealt a severe blow in a recent
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In Pezim v.
British Columbia (Securities Commission) ,35 the court overturned
the findings and orders made by the R.C. Securities Commission
relating to alleged insider trading. In its findings, the commission
had relied not only on the requirements of B.C. securities legis-
lation but also on the more expansive obligations under policy
statements issued by the Canadian Securities Administrators and
the Vancouver Stock Exchange. In challenging the practice of the
Canadian Securities Administrators to regulate by way of policy
statements which have not been sanctioned by a legislature, the
court noted that, "Since the legislature has dealt with [the
disclosure] issue so carefully, specifically and comprehensively,
there is no room for the substitution of a more exacting disclosure
requirement than the legislature has imposed. To do so would be
an error in law. "36 Not surprisingly, the B. C. Securities
Commission is appealing the decision to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The depth of the dependency relationship that has developed
between the tightly knit community of securities regulators and
corporate actors is reflected in the relatively low number of deriv-
33 The concentrated ownership/control of Canada's corporate and financial sectors is
tracked by a relatively small cadre of lawyers and other professional advisors who help
manage these regulatory relationships.
34 For example, the first oppression action brought under the Ontario Business Corpora-
tions Act has languished in pre-trial proceedings for almost a decade. The Ontario
Securities Commission took a lead role in the litigation; delays, in part, are attributable
to competing claims on the commission's resources. See Ontario (Securities Commission)
v. McLaughlin (Stuart Bruce) (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.», Action #16256/86.
35 Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent ofBrokers); Page v. British Columbia (Super-
intendent of Brokers); Ivany v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers) (1992),96
D.L.R. (4th) 137, 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted
(1993),98 D.L.R. (4th) vii.
36 Ibid.,atp. 159D.L.R.
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ative suits brought in Canada. Shareholder passivity is especially
ironic in light of the widespread inclusion of broadly framed
oppression remedies in many Canadian corporate statutes. This
remedy redresses many of the wrongs that are the traditional
preserve of fiduciary duties carried by the derivative and personal
actions. However, in contrast to these conventional remedies, the
oppression remedy has several notable substantive and procedural
advantages, including a focus on the effects of conduct (rather
than underlying motive), a broader range of remedial powers, and
the ability of plaintiffs to proceed by way of summary
application.37
Although the oppression remedy was originally designed to
cure the congenital reluctance of Canadian courts to clearly
delineate the fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders to
minority shareholders in the closely held company context, the
scope and comparative advantages of the remedy have caused
courts to permit its application in unexpected contexts (e.g.,
public companies).38 Our explanation for the relatively infrequent
resort to the courts has been the degree of deference (on grounds
of comparative expertise) accorded decisions of the Ontario
Securities Commission. 39
A final, related feature of the legal/institutional structure of
corporate governance in Canada is the relatively trivial role played
by legislatures in the development of either securities or corporate
law legislation.40 In contrast to the United States, neither the
provincial legislatures nor the federal Parliament has shown any
sustained interest in corporate or securities law issues (or in
37 Brian Cheffins, "The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian
Experience" (1988), 10 U. Pa. J. Int. Bus. L. 305; Jeffrey MacIntosh, "The Oppression
Remedy: Personal or Derivative?" (1991),70 Can. Bar Rev. 29; and "Bad Faith and the
Oppression Remedy: Uneasy Marriage, or Amicable Divorce?" (1990),69 Can. Bar
Rev. 276.
38 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991),49 c.P.c. (2d) 239, 50 O.A.C. 254
(Div. Ct.); and Westfair Foods Ltd. v. Watt (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 48, 79 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 363 (C.A.).
39 Other structural disincentives to shareholder litigation should also be noted. Limits on
class proceedings, contingent fee arrangements and punitive damages, as well as the risk
of liability for the defendant corporation's legal expenses are strong deterrents against
instigating litigation. It should be noted that the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992,
c.6, permits shareholders to commence class actions and enter into contingency fee
arrangements in Ontario.
40 Nigel Wright, "Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Culture: A Comparative Study
of Securities Regulation in Ontario and the United States", LL.M. thesis for Harvard
University on file with the authors.
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asserting jurisdiction therefor). Although legislative committees
have, in the past, been struck to examine corporate and securities
law matters, by and large, such legislative initiative or oversight is
sporadic and unpredictable.
IV. TRENDS IN CANADIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1. The Rise of the Institutional Investor
As in the United States, there is a growing concentration of
share ownership in the hands of Canadian institutional investors
- public and private pension funds, mutual funds, insurance
companies, banks and near-banks. Although accurate data are
elusive, estimates suggest that 50%-60% of the shares of widely
held companies traded in deep markets in Canada are held by
institutional owners.41 This datum is comparable to similar
statistics in the United States, which show institutions controlling
approximately 50% of the equity of all public companies and 70%-
80% of the equity of widely held companies.42
In the United States, the rise of institutional ownership has
received widespread endorsement; by virtue of the size of their
economic investment, the depth of their expertise and the
duration of their investment, institutional investors are thought to
be capable of correcting some of the endemic collective action
problems spawned by the gap between ownership and control. 43 In
Canada, the potential for institutional activism has been similarly
enthusiastic. However, in view of the premium on controlling
agency problems along the inter-investor axis in Canada, institu-
tional investors have been regarded as important advocates of
minority shareholder rights.
In many ways, institutional activism in Canada is still very much
in a nascent stage. As in the United States, the earliest signs of
activism were observed in the takeover context. Specifically,
under the tutelage of Allenvest Inc., an investment dealer
providing governance monitoring services to institutions in
exchange for soft dollar commissions,44 Canadian institutions
41 "Institutions Flex Market Muscle", The Globe and Mail, November 11,1988, p. B18.
42 Coffee,supra, footnote 19, at pp. 1291-2.
43 Jayne Barnard, "Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance" (1991),69
N. C. L. Rev. 435. See generally: Coffee, supra, footnote 19; Bernard Black, "Share-
holder Passivity Reexamined" (1990),89 Mich. L. Rev. 520; and Edward Rock, "The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism" (1991), 79
Geo.L.J.445.
44 Allenvest receives compensation in the form of fees for trades executed through its
office.
2-23 C.B.L.J.
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were able to register their collective dissent regarding a number of
issues: the disparate voting right capital structures implemented to
enshrine control without proportionate equity ownership;45
"unfair" control transactions;46 and the poison pill plans adopted
by several widely held Canadian companies.47 However, in such
instances, institutional activism had to be encouraged by securities
regulators and, even then, required the stimulus (and shield) of an
intermediary.
The institutional response to poison pills is illustrative. Unlike
the United States, provincial securities administrators insisted that
corporations obtain the approval of shareholders prior to
adoption. Nevertheless, despite vigorous lobbying by Allenvest,
the institutions were seldom able to poll more than 45% of the
votes and were, therefore, unable to thwart adoption. 48 The only
judicial challenge to the validity of a poison pill has yet to come to
trial. 49 The relatively lacklustre track record of the institutions
may be attributed to the lack of confidential voting and to
widespread vote-bundling by companies.50 However, in some
cases, the institutions were able to gain important modifications to
the proposed plans that partially addressed their concerns (or, at
least, justified their activism).51 Indeed, it has become routine for
45 See, for example, Hugh Cleland, "Dual Class Capital Companies - Going Vanilla",
[July 1992] Corp. Governance Rev. 1. Dual class recapitalization proposed by Crown
and Seagram's were both scuttled by institutional pressure. See: The Globe and Mail,
April 28, 1986, p. A6; and January 13,1987, p. B1.
46 Canadian Tire Corp. (Re) (1987),35 B.L.R. 56 (O.S.C.), leave to appeal refused, April
13,1987, affg (1987),10 O.S.C.B. 858.
47 Jeffrey MacIntosh, "The Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders"
(1989),15 C.B.L.J. 276.
48 Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 7, at note 131.
49 Caisse de depot et de placement du Quebec v. Inco Ltd., December 5, 1988 (Quebec
S.c.), No. 500-05-013354-889. In Bowater Canadian Ltd. v. R.L. Crain Inc. (1987),46
D.L.R. (4th) 161, 62 O.R. (2d) 752, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down a
provision in Crain Inc.'s articles of incorporation which provided for the issue of special
common shares, which would entitle the initial holder to 10 votes per share but subse-
quent holders to one vote per share only. The court held that the "step-down" provision
breached the statutory requirement for equality of rights within a class of shareholders
and presented a danger of fraud. Given this decision, the lack of subsequent litigation on
the validity of poison pills is all the more surprising.
50 For example, the vote on Inco's poison pill was tied to receipt of a generous, one-time
dividend payment. See discussion criticizing linkage in MacIntosh, supra, footnote 47 at
pp.305-12.
51 For example, typical shareholders' rights plans are triggered when a bidder acquires a
certain percentage of the company's shares (called a "flip-in" event). When this occurs,
all shareholders, except the acquiror, are entitled to certain rights, usually to buy
securities of the company at a discount. Institutional investors, have been successful, in
some cases, in raising the flip-in point, thus making it more difficult to trigger the plan.
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corporations seeking shareholder approval for a poison pill to
consult in advance with institutional shareholder represen-
tatives.52
Having "found their voice" in the poison pill setting, Canadian
institutions (mainly the public pension funds) amplified their
governance role by intervening in (or, more precisely, by reacting
to) conflict-of-interest transactions proposed by controlled
companies. These issues facilitate institutional response because
they are initiated by the corporation, are relatively discrete and
defined, are considered in a "friendly" (often confidential) forum
(i. e., securities commissions) and require little more than
approval or dissent by the institutions (often prompted by
securities commission staff). In contrast, corporate misman-
agement problems - the focus of activism in the United States-
are considerably more complex to analyze than fairness issues and
are hence more costly; as a consequence, they are also much less
susceptible to intervention by institutions.53
Typically, a public corporation proposing a transaction which
may give rise to a "fairness" issue consults with some of its major
institutional shareholders prior to any public statement of intent,
with a view to obtaining their informal reaction. This consultation
may occur before, after, or simultaneously with, any consultations
with provincial securities regulators. As contacts between the
institutions and Canadian corporate management have increased,
Allenvest has become less central to these discussions - although
the company continues to serve an important monitoring function
through its proxy watch service.
One striking feature of the consultative process surrounding a
52 See, for example, Catherine McCall, "An Acceptable Poison Pill? TransAlta's New
Shareholder Bid Approval Plan", [November 1992) Corp. Governance Rev. 6.
TransAlta approached Allenvest prior to its shareholders' meeting to approve the plan.
It then issued a press release stating that changes to the plan would be made if the plan
was approved by shareholders. Allenvest did not oppose adoption of the plan, on the
basis of the proposed amendments.
53 Although this too is changing. Recently, for instance, the American Council of Institu-
tional Investors declared that the focus of the 1993 proxy campaign would be "perfor-
mance, performance, performance". See, IRRC Corporate Governance Newsletter,
September, 1992.
In Canada, there have been three recent cases in which institutions became involved in
a governance dispute that was centred around performance problems and not coloured to
any significant degree by self-interest: Memotec, Sherritt Gordon and Canadian Jorex.
Significantly, however, in each case, the initiative was triggered by a non-institutional
shareholder or intermediary.
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fairness issue is that it is accompanied by relatively scant institu-
tional co-ordination or information-sharing. Another is the degree
to which Canadian institutions are reactive, with their agenda
determined by corporate management and securities regulators.
Unco-ordinated, unilateral reaction obviously dulls institutional
focus and leverage in the governance process. As well, without co-
ordinated search, analysis and negotiating activity, institutions are
making redundant (albeit marginal), and hence economically
wasteful, investments in the same basic activities. In sum, were
there a way to co-ordinate institutional activity, one predicts that
the frequency, depth and quality of institutional voice would
commensurately increase.54
The issue of unco-ordinated institutional action has received
careful attention in the United States. Generally, scholars are
divided in their analysis of why institutions are loath to co-ordinate
their governance activities. Some scholars ascribe the lion's share
of responsibility to innate organizational incentives of the
institutions.55 Others point to a range of legal constraints on insti-
tutional co-ordination.56
In Canada, as in the United States, it is likely that a range of
different constraints explain the antipathy exhibited by institu-
tions towards co-ordination. Legal constraints include the proxy
solicitation rules and insider-trading prohibitions. Organizational
constraints derive from the impacts of concentrated ownership on
the market for portfolio management services and the traditional
focus of the institutions on investment in, and management of,
low-risk, low-yield government debt instruments, which makes
governance activism anathema. And, finally, political constraints
emanate from the pervasive concern'that institutional activism by
public pension funds will be construed as a veiled governmental
attack on Corporate Canada.
This latter concern is highlighted by the emergence of the heads
of public pension funds as the key "players" in the U.S. corporate
54 Edward J. Waitzer, "Are Institutional Shareholders Really Impacting Corporate Gover-
nance?", [1991] Cdn. Inv. Rev. 9.
55 Coffee, supra, footnote 19.
56 Black, supra, footnote 43; Mark Roe "A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance" (1991),91 Col. L. Rev. 10; and Michael Jensen, "Eclipse of the Public Corpo-
ration" (1989), Harv. Bus. Rev. 61. However, see recent revisions by American
Securities Exchange Commission to proxy rules: Securities Exchange Act Release No.
31326 (October 16, 1992).
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governance process. Without necessarily challenging their effec-
tiveness, the visibility they have sought can largely be explained in
the terms of political self-interests.57 The difficulty is that, while
such corporate governance "entrepreneurs" are independent of
management, their interests are not always aligned with those of
beneficial shareowners.58 A new set of agency problems along the
inter-investor axis could easily emerge. 59 In Canada, investment
initiatives of the Caisse de depot et de placement du Quebec, a
major public pension fund, have heightened public sensitivity to
the use of private savings to further public (i.e. , political) objec-
tives, often at the expense of a satisfactory economic return.60
Suggestions that the Government of Ontario might attempt to
exercise similar influence over the investment of public pension
funds in that province were met by strong resistance from the
investment community.
It is inevitable, however, that appropriate intermediaries will
emerge to help institutional investors overcome collective action
and legal barriers to increased activism in the corporate gover-
nance arena. It has been suggested that the mainstage of the
corporate governance debate has shifted from the external
monitor of control transactions (augmented by judicial and
regulatory scrutiny, particularly in the case of related party trans-
actions) to a renewed emphasis on internal monitoring of
managerial performance.61 Already there is growing evidence of
substantial potential gains to be derived from increased institu-
tional activism.62 Indeed, failure to explore such avenues for
57 This was first noted by Roberta Romano in "The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legis-
lation and Public Opinion" (1988), U. Cin. L. Rev. 457 at p. 469, note 32.
58 Waitzer, supra, footnote 54, at p. 11.
59 The problems of monitoring institutional investors were first highlighted by Robert Clark
in his book review, "Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises" (1981),94 Harv. L. Rev. 561.
60 The 1989 $1.3 billion takeover of Steinberg Inc., a company now seeking to restructure
under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, was financed by the Caisse. At the
time, the transaction was hailed by Jean Campeau, chairman of the Caisse, as the
salvation of the company from "outsiders". See, The Financial Post, December 26,1992,
p. 15. Similar investment initiatives of the Caisse include those involving Domtar Inc.
61 Ronald J. Gilson, "Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: An Academic
Perspective", draft paper dated October 5,1992.
62 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, "The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence" (1992), 39 V.C.L.A. L. Rev. 897. The California Public
Retirement System (Calpers) recently commissioned a study by John Pound and Lilli
Gordon which concludes that changes in an underperforming company's strategy or
governance add value as an investment strategy. As a result, a number of funds are being
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increased institutional investor power (and responsibility) may
lead to demand for more intrusive reforms to capital market and
corporate governance structures.63
Recent U.S. experience suggests that enhanced co-operation
between corporate management and institutional investors is
likely to evolve without the need for such regulatory
intervention.64 With adequate impetus and support, the necessary
infrastructure for informed and pro-active relational investing
could easily become the basis for an effective institutional investor
"voice" in the corporate governance process.65
2. The Growing Socialization of the Board
The second, widely discussed trend in Canadian corporate
governance is the growing level of direct personal liability being
placed on the board of directors for myriad harms caused by the
corporation. In the main, the beneficiaries of these duties are non-
shareholder constituencies affected by the corporation's activities,
such as employees, creditors, suppliers, consumers and commu-
nities. The source of this burgeoning liability is both the legislature
and the judiciary. In terms of the former, one Canadian lawyer has
counted 106 different statutes that specify personal liability for
directors and officers in Ontario.66 The statutes articulate respon-
sibility for conduct ranging from environmental spills to occupa-
tional health and safety infractions. In terms of the latter, Leon
and Flaherty document the proliferation of non-statutory liabil-
ities, mainly framed in tort, that bind directors and officers.67 This
considered by Calpers for such investment. See Randall Smith, "Calpers Mulls Studies in
Funds Seeking Changes in Firms' Strategy, Governance", The Wall Street Journal,
December 31, 1992, p. A3.
63 See, e.g., The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Market Speculation
and Corporation Governance (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992)
which proposed to enhance long-term oversight by raising capital gains taxes on short-
term trading, or recent U.S. legislative proposals (including campaign proposals of
President Clinton) to impose a surtax or limit corporate tax deductions on "excessive"
executive compensation.
64 See, e.g., John Pound, "Westinghouse Lights Boardroom Path", The Wall Street
Journal, December 11, 1992, which describes the constructive process and profound
results of institutional shareholders and managers (or directors) working together to
address managerial performance shortfalls at General Motors and Westinghouse.
65 In this regard, the concentrated nature of the Canadian market and legal environments
may be viewed as more conducive to effective institutional activism in corporate gover-
nance than is the case in the U.S.
66 D. Palmateer (with the assistance of Grace Kimucho and Anna Torma), "Statutory
Liabilities and Offences of Directors and Officers in Ontario", draft memorandum dated
October 9, 1990, on file with the authors.
67 Barry Leon and Patrick Flaherty, "The Expanding Non-Statutory Personal Liability of
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expansion in liability has been achieved without any substantial
change in the content of the corporate law governing directorial
conduct.68
The rationale for this expansion of liability has been framed in
terms of the growing ascendency of stakeholder conceptions of the
corporation,69 on the belief that adding direct personal responsi-
bility to general enterprise liability will reduce significantly the
level of corporate wrongdoing in society, and on the desire to
achieve adequate levels of compensation for victims of corporate
wrongdoing. Unfortunately, however, each of these liability
theories is beset by serious defects, resulting in a fairly flimsy basis
for expansion.
To begin with, the normative legitimacy of stakeholder concep-
tions of the corporation has been called into question for its
inability to control internal agency problems of the firm. 70 Under
the traditional normative view of the solvent corporation, only
shareholders enjoy a direct claim (secured by a mixture of voting
rights and explicit fiduciary duties) on the discretionary (i.e., non-
contractual) activities of management. In contrast, exaggerated
stakeholder conceptions of the corporation refuse to give any
special purchase to shareholder interests. Instead, the corporation
exists to vindicate stakeholder interests as manifested in some
hypothetical (i.e., self-serving) bargain. However, if shareholders
- as a concrete, relatively homogenous set of interests - are not
Directors, Officers and Senior Employees", paper prepared for Canadian Bar Associ-
ation, Ontario, 1992 Institute Programme, The Law of Agency.
68 In this respect, the expansion parallels the growth of tort liability claims that precipitated
the insurance crisis of the mid 19805. The expansion of liability was achieved without any
meaningful change in the underlying legal rules. See Michael Trebilcock, "The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modem North American Tort Law: A Canadian
Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis" (1987),24 San. D. L. Rev. 929.
(f) The leading Canadian precedent on takeover defensive tactics, for instance, refers to the
ability of managers to vindicate stakeholder interests. See Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar
(1972),33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.S.C.), which was followed in
Olympia and York Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (Re) (1986),37
D.L.R. (4th) 193, 59 O.R. (2d) 254 (Div. Ct.); and Exco Corp. Ltd. v. Nova Scotia
Savings & Loan Co. (1987),78 N.S.R. (2d) 91, 35 B.L.R. 149 (S.c.). The oppression
remedy has supported a number of creditor claims, although in each case it is unclear
whether the court is actually creating quasi-fiduciary duties to creditors or simply
permitting aggrieved creditors the opportunity to resolve what are essentially contractual
claims through the expedited hearing process of an oppression remedy (see Canadian
Opera Co. v. 670800 Ontario Inc. (1990),75 D.L.R. (4th) 765, 75 O.R. (2d) 720 (Gen.
Div.).
70 See Ronald Daniels, "Takeovers and Stakeholders: Contractarianism and Compassion"
(1993),43 U.T.L.J., forthcoming.
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to serve as the principals of the corporation, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to be able to meaningfully evaluate managerial
conduct, thereby impairing the effectiveness of shareholder
oversight. To say that managers are loyal to some vague and
unarticulated set of stakeholder interests is equivalent to saying
that they need not be loyal to anyone. Preferable is a situation in
which directors and managers are required to maximize share-
holder wealth, subject to whatever contractual and legislative
duties are owed to other stakeholders.
A second putative rationale for expanded liability based on
general deterrence is equally flawed. To be persuasive, it is
necessary to show that there is, in fact, undeterred corporate
wrongdoing that is occurring in society and that this wrongdoing
can be contained through the addition of mandatory and direct
personal responsibility for directors. After all, the fact that a
regime of enterprise liability is currently in place means that
corporate wrongdoing does not go undeterred, only that some
corporate actors, namely investors, are targeted over directors
(and managers). Investor liability derives from the loss in security
values experienced when a large social liability is imposed on the
corporation.
Why might a regime of enterprise liability be insufficient to
achieve efficient levels of discipline on corporate conduct? One
explanation lies in the bargaining infirmities plaguing investor-di-
rector negotiations. It may well be efficient for investors to
transfer certain risks to directors, but investor collective action
problems impair these negotiations.71 However, in light of the
high levels of share ownership concentration in Canada, this
problem is unlikely to be serious. Alternatively, the efficient
transfer of risk may be subverted by enforcement difficulties,
which require public enforcement and sanctions.72 However, to be
accurate, intervention grounded on this rationale usually implies
criminal (not merely civil) sanctions, which to date have rarely
been observed in the Canadian context.
71 Many of these themes are developed in Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman,
"Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts" (1991), 100 Yale L. J.
1879.
72 See generally: John Coffee "Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Towards a Theoretical View
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response" (1977), 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099;
and " 'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick?': An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386; and Christopher
Stone, "The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct" (1980),
90 Yale L.J. 1.
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We do not mean to say that intervention that increases the
responsibility for directors (and officers) on deterrence grounds
can never be justified, only that doing so requires some plausible
empirical support. Caution in re-allocating responsibility for
corporate wrongdoing is especially warranted in view of the desir-
ability of attracting active independent directors into Canadian
boardrooms to enhance governance standards, the myriad organi-
zational barriers that impede the board's ability to transmit its
preferences to the operational parts of the corporation, and the
propensity of lower level managers to engage in sub-goal
pursuits.73
The final potential ground for intervention, ensuring sufficient
compensation for victims of corporate harm, is the easiest to
dismiss. In the absence of organized insurance markets, there is
little reason to believe that officers and directors are the most
efficient risk bearers ofcorporate wrongdoing. Because all of their
personal wealth is at stake and this wealth may not necessarily be
substantial, directors (and officers) may be extremely risk-averse.
As is well known, managerial risk aversion on its own poses
substantial agency problems for the corporation.74 Further, as one
of us has argued elsewhere, the addition of developed insurance
markets may do little to control the actual risk borne by directors
and officers.75 Directors' and officers' insurance in Canada is
notoriously thin, being plagued by massive exclusions, low
coverage ceilings and short coverage periods.76
V. CONCLUSION
In Canada the claim has frequently been made that there is a
new paradigm for corporate governance, fuelled in large part by
the rise of the new shareholder monitors, in conjunction with a
growing sensitivity of the board to its broad societal responsibil-
73 See discussion in Coffee, ibid., at pp. 1132-47.
74 Yakov Amihud et al., "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers" (1981), 12 Bell J. Econ. 605; and" 'Managerialism', 'Ownership' and Risk"
(1983),7 J. Banking Fin. 189. See also A. Marcus, "Risk Sharing and the Theory ofthe
Firm" (1982), 13 BellJ. Econ. 369.
75 Ronald Daniels and Susan Hutton, "The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the
Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis for Canadian Corporate Governance"
(1993), 22C.B.L.J. 182.
76 Daniels and Hutton, ibid.
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ities. We do not doubt that these trends are impacting on the
governance system, but we do take issue with the nature and
extent of the effects. It seems to us that the two trends enumerated
above are pulling the board in different, deeply contradictory,
directions.
On the one hand, institutional ownership is increasing the
responsibility of the board to its traditional principals - the share-
holders. While the demographics of corporate control and the
activism of securities regulators in Canada may have directed
undue attention to the "fairness" of related party transactions, it is
clear that, in a setting of rapid globalization, institutional share-
holders expect boards to playa leading role in readying corpora-
tions for intense product market competition. This role calls out
for vigorous strategic leadership that is designed to increase the
level of firm specific advantage. In some cases, strategic
management is forward-looking and benign, as when it focuses on
product development. In other cases, however, strategic
management may require wrenching rationalization that Will, by
definition, inflict severe costs on corporate stakeholders.77
On the other hand, the capacity of directors to fulfil the growing
expectations of shareholders is being impaired by the mounting
level of social liabilities imposed on them.78 With limited ability to
shift risks via insurance, individuals invited to serve on corporate
boards will have little choice but to refuse to serve, or will do so on
the basis that the corporation erect costly liability shields or avoid
any danger of running afoul of the law. This latter option m~y
sound laudable but, given the primacy of compensation objectives
in the liability calculus, there is little question that a board
governed by these concerns will not be assuming sufficient risk.
The pernicious effect of social liability on board decision-
making is best illustrated in the context of employee layoffs. In
order to improve the competitiveness of the corporation, a board
T7 Illustrated by the recent spate of restructuring, generally achieved outside the ambit of
corporate law, in many sectors of the Canadian economy (e.g., real estate, natural
resources, retail, financial services, steel).
78 These themes are explained by Ronald Daniels and Edward Morgan in, "Independent
Directors Should Stay Gatekeepers", The Financial Post, July 1, 1992, p. 10; and
"Directors Face Grab-Bag of Liabilities", The Financial Post, August 12, 1992, p. 10.
wil
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may be required to engineer a massive reduction in the workforce
-witness the case ofGM, IBM and Digital.79 Such layoffs may be
the only way to ensure the survival of the company. Shareholders
will expect, indeed insist, that such decisions be made. However,
if directors and officers face direct personal responsibility for the
loss in employee human capital, they will be understandably loath
to sanction these decisions. Hence, the conflict between these two
trends.
As the "board overboard" trend in several recent Canadian
casesso shows, these conflicts have become most readily apparent
when a company is heading toward bankruptcy, the time precisely
when the board is best equipped to assist in the management of the
company.81 If and when institutional attention focuses more
rigorously on improving corporate performance (other than in the
"vicinity of insolvency"), the friction between directorial respon-
sibilities and liabilities will become even less tolerable.
It is not atypical of the Canadian economic and regulatory
landscape to observe high levels of concentration and regulatory
intervention. In the corporate governance context, these tandem
features appear to have dampened the entrepreneurial incentives
for institutional, as well as directorial, activism. It is to be hoped
(and expected) that the global integration of markets will strip
away such disincentives and create opportunities for dynamic
innovation and reform in corporate governance practices and
standards. Legislative review of the conflicting policy effects
outlined above would undoubtedly facilitate this process.
More promising, in the near term, is the opportunity for
measured collective action by institutional investors to improve
corporate performance through constructive oversight. To the
extent such efforts lead to a strengthening of boards of directors
79 See The Globe and Mail, May 25,1992, p. B2; The Wall Street Journal, December 1,
1992, p. AI; and The Globe and Mail, July 24,1992, p. B9.
80 For example, directors of troubled Westar Mining Ltd., Canadian Airlines International
Ltd. and Peoples Jewellers Ltd. have resigned en masse rather than face mounting
personal liability. In the case of Peoples Jewellers Ltd., a new board of directors was
recruited by the establishment of a financial trust that guarantees payment of their
potential liabilities should the company go bankrupt. See The Globe and Mail, July 22,
1992, p. Bl; July 31, 1992, p. Bl; and August 29, 1992, p. Bl; and The Financial Post,
December 26, 1992, p.16.
81 See generally: Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston, Harvard University,
1971); and Jay Lorsch with Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of
America's Boards (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1989).
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(which is a central form of indirect monitoring), private market
solutions should attenuate the often misdirected efforts of legis-
lators (and courts) to impose personal liability on individuals who
are expected to play such a key role in improving corporate gover-
nance.
